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lP'JR<OJBJLEM OF AIR 
<QUAJLJ[TI[ NONa.A'ITAINMENT 
RONALD H. ROSENBERG¢ 
INTRODUCTION 
An increasing awareness and concern for matters of environ-
mental quality has led to greater social pressure for environmen-
tal protection. Although many pressing public issues compete for 
our collective attention, the subject of air pollution and its control 
appears near the top of the list. Despite this high level of public 
interest and support, air pollution remains a serious social prob-
lem which affects millions of Americans. 
Over the last twenty years, Congress has established air pol-
lution abatement as a national priority. To achieve this objective, 
the Clean Air Act sets forth the national ambient air quality stan-
dards ("NAAQS") to protect public health and welfare.1 In order 
to accomplish this public health purpose, Congress created a sys-
tem of air quality regulation that allocates discrete planning, reg-
ulatory and enforcement functions to both federal and state levels 
of government. Moreover, this functional distribution has been 
made for political as well as practical reasons. What is most sig-
nificant is that the Clean Air Act has set forth a complex environ-
mental policy goal to be achieved through a planning and 
regulatory system relying upon intergovernmental cooperation. 
Although the attainment of health-protecting air quality stan-
dards might be congressionally supported as a national goal, its 
actual achievement often has been perceived as imposing serious 
burdens upon local industries and interfering with the transporta-
tion choices of individuals and state and local governments.2 As 
such, the Clean Air Act's air quality attainment goals could con-
* Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of law, College of William and 
Mary. 
1. See Clean Air Act § 109, 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1988). 
2. See, e.g., Crow & Williams, U.S. Refiners Facing Squeeze Under New 
Federal, State Air Quality Rules, Oil & Gasj.,jan. 23, 1989 at 281 (lead industry 
would be harmed by air quality regulations). 
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flict with other significant values held by state and local govern-
ment and by individual citizens. The divergence in interests 
between levels of government might affect the nature of state and 
local government participation in the federal scheme of air quality 
control. This Article focuses on the design of an intergovern-
mental planning and regulatory system in which the participants 
do not, or may not, share the same desire to achieve the national 
environmental objectives. 
For over thirty years, Congress has identified air quality as a 
legitimate federal concern. The body oflaw that has arisen repre-
sents a complex area of governmental regulation involving all 
three branches of government. In 1990, after thirteen years, 
Congress finally amended the Clean Air Act, the nation's primary 
air pollution law.3 This complex set of amendments represents 
the most recent legislative expression of national air pollution 
policy. In adopting this new law, Congress has adopted provi-
sions which will alter the path of environmental policy develop-
ment in a myriad of significant ways. More importantly, this 
statute sets the course for the 1990s and will likely be the federal 
air pollution law of the next century. 
This Article addresses several fundamental and related ques-
tions: what has been the intergovernmental structure of the sys-
tem of air pollution control established under federal law? How 
have the relationships between federal and non-federal levels of 
government changed during the twenty-year development of the 
Clean Air Act? To what extent is the continuing problem of 
NAAQS non-attainment affected by the structure of air quality 
planning, regulation, and enforcement established under the 
Clean Air Act? Has the adoption of the 1990 Clean Air Act 
amendments (" 1990 Act") resulted in the improvement of inter-
governmental relationships, making NAAQS attainment and 
maintenance more likely in the future? 
This Article concludes that universal NAAQS attainment re-
mains a fundamental yet elusive public policy objective. More-
over, it argues that intergovernmental relationships defined by 
the Act have evolved under the changing framework of federal air 
pollution law. While retaining the basic structure of intergovern-
mental relationships, the 1990 Act has established a highly-de-
fined air quality planning and regulatory program with clearer 
operational provisions. In the end the success or failure of the 
3. Clean Air Act Amendments of I990, Pub. L. No. I 0 I-549, I 04 Stat. 2399 
(1990) [hereinafter I990 Act]. 
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Act in reaching attainment depends substantially upon the contin-
ued commitment of state and local government and a high degree 
of popular support. The future role of the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency ("EPA") in this cooperative enterprise will be to mo-
tivate and encourage state participation in a congressionally 
specified system of air pollution control. 
I 
THE EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL AIR POLLUTION 
LAW AND POLICY: 1955 TO 1970 
Emerging Federal Interest.-After World War II, state govern-
ment took the lead in developing legal responses to the emerging 
problem of air pollution.4 However, limitations inherent in the 
size and reach of individual state governments restricted the po-
tential for developing an effective system of state-centered air 
pollution control.5 Restricted geographical jurisdiction, inade-
quate resources and expertise, and conflicting state regulatory in-
terests limited the potential effectiveness of the state approach to 
air pollution control.6 Although air pollution was widely consid-
ered a public health and aesthetic menace, no unified or national 
concept of unacceptable pollution yet existed.7 Consequently, 
the non-attainment issue had not yet arisen. During the 1950s 
and 1960s, congressional action began to define a federal interest 
in air pollution control. This emerging federal interest and resul-
tant body of law predominated after 1970, when federal law de-
veloped the idea of a national air quality standard. 
The 1955 Act.-Over a thirty-five year history, federal air pol-
lution law has grown immensely in its scope and complexity. This 
statutory evolution has been accompanied by a series of changes 
in the relationship between federal and state governments in the 
area of air pollution control. This section describes the develop-
ment of federal air pollution legislation from 1955 through 1970, 
giving special attention to matters of intergovernmental 
relationships. 
As the states' interest in air pollution grew during the 1950s, 
Congress moved slowly to enact legislation in the field. In 1955, 
Congress passed a statute authorizing the Surgeon General to 
4. See, e.g., Cowan, Air Pollution Control in New Jersey, 9 Rutgers L. Rev. 
609, 631 (1954). 
5. See Note, State Common Law Actions and Federal Pollution Control 
Statutes: Can They Work Together?, 1986 U. Ill. L. Rev. 609, 620. 
6. See id. 
7. See Cowan, supra note 4, at 631-32. 
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fund or to undertake research into air pollution abatement and to 
disseminate such results to state and local air pollution control 
agencies.s Furthermore, in an effort to carry out the mandate, 
this two page statute authorized an appropriation of up to five 
million dollars per year for five years to fund research, training, 
and demonstration projects. 9 With this modest start, the federal 
government entered the field of air pollution, viewing it as a suita-
ble subject of study for public health purposes. 10 
In this early statute, Congress emphasized the secondary and 
supportive role that the federal government was to play with the 
states in the battle against air pollution. The preamble of the 
1955 Act stated that the main congressional policy was "to pre-
serve and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of the 
States and local governments in controlling air pollution .... " 11 
Following the pattern of the prior seventy-five years, and de-
spite its provision for financial and technical assistance, Congress 
took great pains to acknowledge the primacy of state and local 
governments and the limited aspirations of the federal govern-
ment. Specifically, it continued to consider air pollution as a pub-
lic health matter principally oflocal concern and one for which no 
national policy was necessary. The idea of federal intervention 
through the actions of a regulatory agency was not yet an alterna-
tive to local control. 12 The 1955 Act represented a modest, non-
regulatory effort to involve the federal health agency in the study 
of the air pollution problem. The law would begin to change in 
the 1960s. 
The Clean Air Act of 1963 .-In 1963, Congress returned to the 
subject of air pollution control when it enacted the first statute 
entitled the "Clean Air Act." 13 The 1963 law added to the pre-
existing components of the 1955 Act, but it also began to develop 
a distinctly federal character to the emerging program. While 
providing funding at a level nearly six times that of the prior Act's 
8. See Act of july 14, 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-159, 69 Stat. 322 (1955). 
9. Id. § 5(a), 69 Stat. at 322-23. 
10. Id., 69 Stat. at 322. 
II. Id., 69 Stat. at 322. 
12. The Senate Report on what eventually became the 1955 Act stated 
flatly: "[t]he committee recognizes that it is the primary responsibility of State 
and local governments to prevent air pollution. The bill docs not propose any 
exercise of police power by the Federal Government and no provision in it in-
vades the sovereignty of States, counties, or cities. There is no attempt to im-
pose standards of purity." S. Rep. No 389, 84th Cong., 1st Scss. at 351 (1955), 
reprinted in 1955 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, 2457, 2459. 
13. Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963). 
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authorization, the 1963 Clean Air Act also emphasized the crea-
tion of a national air pollution research and development pro-
gram that did not merely respond to local requests for 
information. Rather, as part of this federal research function, the 
statute specifically charged the United States Department of 
Health, Education and Welfare ("HEW") with the responsibility 
for compiling and publishing documents known as air pollution 
criteria.14 These criteria were intended to reflect the latest scien-
tific knowledge useful in indicating the kind and extent of health 
and welfare effects resulting from the exposure to air pollutants. 15 
With the development of these air pollution criteria documents, 
the nature of the federal role in air pollution control began to 
change. Instead of providing research support, the federal gov-
ernment became responsible for administrative standard-setting. 
The air quality criteria would later become the basis for setting 
the NAAQ') under the 1970 Clean Air Act.16 
The 1963 Act also was significant for its establishment of the 
federal policy of providing direct funding for state and local air 
pollution control agencies.17 While this financial support aided 
the creation of sub-federal anti-pollution agencies, it also initiated 
a pattern of state dependence on programmatic funding. This 
form of federal funding continues today. With the expansion of 
the federal role in sponsoring air pollution control agencies, Con-
gress moved the federal government into a position of challeng-
ing the previously state- and local-dominated system of pollution 
abatement. 
Although reluctant in 1955 to intrude into the states' sover-
eignty over pollution control, Congress found it possible in 1963 
to create a procedure for federal abatement ofinterstate air pollu-
tion. The idea that the federal government could abate interstate 
public nuisances was not new,1s but the 1963 statute established 
the federal government as the more important actor in the pro-
cess of pollution control. While this abatement procedure proved 
largely unworkable in practice, 19 it did represent a novel view that 
14. Id. at § 3(c}(2), 77 Stat. at 395. 
15. Id. 
16. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
17. Pub. L. No. 88-206, § 3(b)(3), 77 Stat. 392, 394 (1963). 
18. See Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907). 
19. See D. Currie, Air Pollution-Federal law and Analysis 1-12 to 1-14 
(1981); see, e.g., United States v. Bishop Processing Co., 287 F. Supp. 624 
(D. Md. 1968), aff'd, 423 F.2d 469 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 904 (1970); 
Edelman, Federal Air and Water Pollution Control: The Application of the 
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air pollution problems had a greater than local significance and 
that the federal government had a legitimate role in resolving in-
terstate air pollution disputes. Finally, although the 1963 Act 
granted no direct federal regulatory authority, it did extend fed-
eral administrative activity in the field, and it also established a 
more aggressive function for HEW in enforcing the emerging en-
vironmentallaw.2o The recognition of state interests in the con-
trol of air pollution would not be directly addressed until 1970. 
The Air Quality Act of 1967 .-The next step in the develop-
ment of federal air pollution control legislation was the passage 
of the 1967 Air Quality Act.21 This statute introduced a number 
of fundamental organizational concepts which would remain with 
the federal air pollution control program well beyond 1967. 
First, the Act required HEW to establish "atmospheric areas" 
that shared a common climate, topography, and meteorology.22 
Within these areas, HEW was directed to define "air quality con-
trol regions" ("AQCR") which would be used for imposing air 
quality standards.23 Second, the federal agency was then to issue 
"criteria of air quality" and reports on "pollution control tech-
niques" setting forth the most current information on those top-
ics. 24 Third, each state was mandated to designate ambient air 
quality standards consistent with the criteria and control tech-
niques for each AQCR within its borders.25 Finally, the 1967 Act 
obligated each state to prepare an implementation plan to set 
emission standards and compliance schedules for specific sources 
within its borders. 26 
In sum, the 1967 scheme of air quality planning and regula-
tion vested considerable authority in each state with loose federal 
supervision and little direct control. Although the 1967 Act pro-
vided a number of organizing principles that would be carried 
over into subsequent federal legislation, it represented the last 
vestige of state autonomy in the control of air pollution. And 
even though the Act soon would be superseded by the compre-
Commerce Power to Abate Interstate and Intrastate Pollution, 33 Geo. Wash. L. 
Rev. 1067 (1965). 
20. Pub. L. No. 88-206, § 8, 77 Stat. at 400. 
21. Air Quality Act, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485 (1967). 
22. Id. § 107(a)(l), 81 Stat. at 490. 
23. Id. § 107(a)(2), 81 Stat. at 490-91. 
24. Id. §§ 107(b), (c), 81 Stat. at 491. 
25. Id. § 108(c)(l), 81 Stat. at 492. 
26. Id. § 108(c)(2), 81 Stat. at 492. 
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hensive 1970 statute, it provided the foundation for the future 
federal-state relationship in air quality planning and enforcement. 
III 
THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1970 
A. Foundation of Change The Clean Air Amendments of 
197027 ("1970 Act") was the first comprehensive federal regula-
tory statute concerned with environmental quality to be enacted. 
Its passage came at a time of great social concern about environ-
mental matters.28 For example, it followed Earth Day, an event 
that focused the nation's attention on matters of environmental 
quality, 29 by approximately six months. The general societal in-
terest in environmental issues manifested itself in a political way 
at the national level. Within a period of two years, Congress ac-
tively considered and enacted a number of sweeping environmen-
tal bills, including the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 
("NEPA"),30 the 1970 Act31 and the Federal '\Vater Pollution 
Control Act. 32 Why was this federal legislative and administrative 
effort necessary? Within the field of air pollution control, con-
gressional leaders thought the 1967 Air Quality Act inadequate to 
the task and its own prior implementation "regrettably slow."33 
In addition, the 1970 Act reflected a fundamental change in the 
federal view of the states' capacity to cure air pollution on an indi-
vidual basis. Heavy reliance upon the efforts of state and local 
governments seemed misplaced because these entities often 
27. Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970). 
28. The political rhetoric of the time described the nation as facing a seri-
ous air pollution crisis imposing costs of as much as 38 billion dollars per year in 
environmentally induced diseases. A recurring opinion expressed during the 
development of the 1970 Act was that population growth, industrial production, 
and rising affiuence had a substantial affect on the intolerable air quality condi-
tions of many urban areas. Thus, Senator Edmund Muskie, the Senate sponsor 
of the bill, noted in the conference report: 
[W]e learned that air pollution is more severe, more pervasive and gro\\ing 
faster than we had thought. Unless we recognized the crisis and generated a 
sense of urgency, national lead times to find and apply control measures 
could melt away without any chance for a rational solution to the air pollu-
tion problem. 
116 Cong. Rec. 42,382 (1970). 
29. See Lewis, The Spirit of the First Earth Day, 16 EPA Journal 8 ijan./ 
Feb. 1990). 
30. Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970). 
31. Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970). 
32. Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84 Stat. 91 (1970). 
33. H.R. Rep. No. 1146, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 5356, 5360 (1970). 
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lacked the expertise, resources, and desire to regulate air pollut-
ing sources stringently. 
Furthermore, the enactment of the main federal anti-pollu-
tion laws indicated an understanding that air and water pollution 
problems should be approached in a uniform and scientifically 
based fashion that was not limited by the artificial boundaries of 
states. Air was perceived as a natural resource which moved ac-
cording to natural forces and respected no political boundaries. 
These environmental problems were transformed into national 
dilemmas requiring national solutions. The Clean Air Act not 
only reflected the national interest in the subject of air pollution, 
but also it allocated extensive regulatory powers to the newly con-
stituted EPA. Environmental improvement was now to be the 
province of an expert federal agency. As such, the 1970 Act rep-
resented a quantum leap in federal responsibility for cleaning up 
the air. 
B. Steps Leading to Attainment.-The drafters of the 1970 Act 
designed a system of air pollution control that was comprehensive 
in scope and optimistic in objective. As its central purpose, the 
Act established the national policy goal of uniform air quality 
high enough to protect all citizens against adverse pollution-cre-
ated health effects.34 To achieve this result, the 1970 Act set forth 
a three-part strategy containing the following components: 
(1) environmental quality objectives; (2) national performance 
standards; and (3) planning and enforcement mechanisms.35 
These three features comprised the major elements of a rational 
planning model for reaching tpe Act's air quality goals. A com-
mon factor affecting each of these items was that the air quality 
objectives had to be achieved within a congressionally mandated 
time. 36 The addition of a temporal dimension to the Clean Air 
Act's structure was undoubtedly intended to provide a discipline 
to the regulatory process. However, it also gave rise to the possi-
bility of regulatory failure in achieving the Act's goals. This is the 
problem of non-attainment. 
Environmental Q]tality Objectives-The National Ambient Air Qp.al-
ity Standards .-The 1970 Act established the concept of the 
NAAQS as the Act's main organizing principle and regulatory ob-
34. Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 4(a), 84 Stat. at 1679-80 (amending Clean Air Act 
§ 109, 42 u.s.c. § 7409 (1988)). 
35. See id., 84 Stat. at 1678-84 (amending Clean Air Act §§ 108-111, 42 
u.s.c. §§ 7408-7411 (1988)). 
36. Id., 84 Stat. at 1679 (amending Clean Air Act § 109(a)(l), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7409(a)(1) (1988)). 
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jective.37 Importantly, the statute made the function of NAAQS 
determination an exclusively federal responsibility.38 This was a 
major departure from the 1967 scheme of allowing the states to 
set and enforce their own ambient air quality standards.39 
Under the terms of sections 108 and 109 ofthe 1970 amend-
ments,40 the EPA was to develop the NAAQS at two increasingly 
stringent levels: primary standards to protect human health and 
secondary ones which would preserve the public welfare. The 
statute then laid out a multi-step NAAQS standard-setting proce-
dure to be exercised by the EPA in its role as a health effects and 
technology assessment expert.41 Within this context the EPA set 
standards for six pollutants and thereby defined the meaning of 
"healthy air" for the nation. Although there has been some ad-
justment of the standards over the twenty year period, the 
NAAQS have remained relatively stable in number and definition. 
Recently, however, there have been demands to tighten the air 
quality standards further to protect public health.42 
National Perfonnance Standards .-A second significant compo-
nent of the 1970 Act's structure was the allocation to the EPA of 
the responsibility for setting performance standards for new mo-
tor vehicles, new polluting facilities, and sources of hazardous air 
emissions.43 Believing that each of these sources presented a se-
rious threat to air quality, Congress granted the EPA the author-
ity to mandate emission performance standards in the form of 
technological solutions to reduce air emissions. Exhaust pollu-
tion from new motor vehicles was required to be reduced by at 
least ninety percent in no more than six years.44 Once again Con-
gress selected a policy which emphasized the centralized EPA's 
development of state-of-the-art technical rules for significant air 
pollution sources. This technologically optimistic policy assumed 
the EPA to be sufficiently competent to make these complex engi-
37. Id., 84 Stat. at 1678-79 (amending Clean Air Act§§ 108-109, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 7408-7409 (1988)). 
38. Id. 
39. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
40. Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 4(a), 84 Stat. at 1678-79 (amending Clean Air Act 
§§ 108-109, 42 u.s.c. §§ 7408-7409 (1988)). 
41. Id., 84 Stat. at 1679-80 (amending Clean Air Act § 109, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7409 (1988)). 
42. 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 222 Uune 17, 1988) (criticism of ambient so2 
standards); see also 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2525 (Apr. 22, 1988). 
43. See Clean Air Act subchapter II,§§ 111, 112,42 U.S.C. §§ 7521-7554, 
7411, 7412 (1988). 
44. See id. § 202(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7421(b)(1) (1988). 
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neering judgments and to be free from any anti-regulatory atti-
tude that a state might foster in its desire to encourage local 
industry. 
Planning and Enforcement Mechanisms .-The final major compo-
nent in the 1970 Clean Air Act scheme of air quality management 
was the development of the State Implementation Plan ("SIP").45 
The drafters of the Act viewed the SIP as the principal mechanism 
for state involvement in the newly federalized system of air pollu-
tion control.46 Each state was required to devise a plan contain-
ing certain statutorily enumerated provisions that would attain 
the primary NAAQS "as expeditiously as practicable but ... in no 
case later than three years from the date of[plan approval] .... "47 
Read literally, this would have meant that SIPs would have had to 
project attainment ofthe primary NAAQS by 1975, or 1977 at the 
latest, if certain extensions were granted. Maintenance of the pri-
mary NAAQS would thereafter have been required, and the sec-
ondary NAAQS would have had to have been achieved within a 
"reasonable time."4B 
The controlling idea in section 110 was that states, rather 
than the EPA, would be free to design a SIP tailored to their indi-
vidual pollution control preferences.49 This local option system 
permitted the states to make the most direct public policy choices 
about which categories of sources would reduce their emission 
and to what degree. 5° The language of the 1970 Act in general 
45. Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 4(a), 84 Stat. 1680-83 (amending Clean Air Act 
§ 110, 42 u.s.c. § 7410 (1988)). 
46. The conference report accompanying the 1970 Clean Air Act contained 
the following language: 
The conference substitute makes it the primary responsibility of each State 
to assure air quality within the entire geographic area comprising such State 
by submitting an implementation plan for such State for achieving air qual-
ity standards. All interstate and intrastate regions designated prior to en-
actment of this legislation would remain in effect. The Administrator 
retains authority to designate interstate and intrastate regions and is author-
ized to approve the establishment by the State of intrastate regions. 
H.R. Rep. No. 1783, 9lst Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code Cong. & 
Admin. News 5376. 
47. Clean Air Act § 110(a)(2)(A)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(A)(i) (1988) 
(amended 1990). 
48. Id. § 110(a)(2)(A)(ii), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(A)(ii). 
49. However, the statute's anti-preemptive policy contained in section 116 
was limited. States could not vary the automobile standards, except for Califor-
nia, nor could they change the new sources performance standards set under 
Clean Air Act§ Ill, 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (1988) (amended 1990). 
50. See 116 Cong. Rec. 42,382 (1970) (statement of Sen. Muskie) ("The 
Senate remains convinced that most effective enforcement of standards would 
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continued to speak in terms of local or state autonomy. Thus, 
one of the Act's initial findings was that "the prevention and con-
trol of air pollution is the primary responsibility of states and lo-
cal government."5 1 
The EPA principally had an evaluative function in this state-
managed plan formulation process; it ascertained whether the SIP 
air pollution control provisions projected attainment of the 
NAAQS by the date specified in the Act. Other functions allotted 
to the EPA in the 1970 Act include approving SIP revisions, ex-
tending compliance or attainment dates, and producing its own 
SIP in case of state default.52 The 1970 Act also accorded the 
EPA significant enforcement powers both to order source compli-
ance with SIP requirements and to seek judicial enforcement in 
federal court. 5 3 For example, under the Act, EPA approval of a 
state's SIP rendered it federally enforceable and alterable only 
·with the EPA's consent.54 Furthermore, a special provision ex-
isted to permit the EPA to assume SIP state enforcement respon-
sibilities when there was widespread SIP violation and a failure of 
state enforcement.55 While the rhetoric surrounding the enact-
ment of the 1970 statute employed the language of shared power, 
the federal actors appeared to have the upper hand. Congress set 
the framework for air quality planning and installed the EPA as 
the supervisor of the state's conduct, possessing significant pow-
ers of preemption should the state fail to enforce its SIP.56 To 
assist the states, the 1970 Act authorized federal funding to help 
support state air pollution programs.57 With the adoption of sec-
tion llO, the structure of intergovernmental relationships af-
forded the federal government at least nominal superiority over 
the states in the design and implementation of the SIPs. So long 
as the EPA-approved SIPs actually provided for timely attainment 
of the NAAQS, the odds of intergovernmental conflict remained 
low. Nevertheless, the 1970 Act created the potential for an ad-
take place on the State and local levels. It was here that the public could partici-
pate most actively and bring the most effective pressure to bear for clean air."). 
51. Clean Air Act § 101(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a}(3) (1988) (amended 
1990). 
52. See id. §§ 110(a)(3), 110(e)-(f), 110(c), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410(a)(3), 7410(e)-
(f), 7410(c). 
53. See id. § 113, 42 U.S.C. § 7413. 
54. Id. §§ 110(a}(3), 113, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410(a}(3), 7413. 
55. Id. § 113(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(2). 
56. Id. § 110(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c)(1). 
57. The 1970 Act provided authorization for one billion dollars in slate 
program funding over the period 1971-73. See 116 Cong. Rec. 42,386 (1970). 
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versarial relationship between the federal and state governments 
if air quality goals were not reached. 
As the mid-1970s' attainment dates approached, it became 
rapidly apparent that in many areas the NAAQS would not be 
achieved on time. 58 The Clean Air Act's SIP strategy-unrealistic 
in temporal terms-had failed to produce timely attainment. This 
failure presented the EPA with a daunting responsibility: the de-
sign of a post-attainment date policy without express congres-
sional direction. Many questions remained to be answered: 
would all states with non-attainment areas be required to submit 
plan revisions indicating attainment? What would the new attain-
ment date be? The implications of non-attainment were thought 
to be bleak. 59 
The non-attainment issue also crystallized the conflict be-
tween the federal goals of clean air and local economic and social 
interests in economic health. Recognition of this conflict high-
lighted the direct link between federal air pollution policy and lo-
cal land use and economic development. 
Yet there remained the question of whether the pursuit of 
nationwide attainment would be justified and supported when the 
true dimensions of the aggregated associated economic cost to 
local interests were known. The EPA was unwilling to administer 
a devastating blow of federally mandated factory shutdowns to 
the American economy as a consequence of non-attainment. In 
1976, it fashioned an interim policy to preserve its general air 
quality goals without unduly stifling economic growth. And, to 
accommodate both the federal and the local interests, it also de-
veloped an "offset" or "trade-off" policy that would permit lim-
ited new source growth in non-attainment areas. 60 The 
centerpiece of this policy used new source construction to spur 
the cleanup or shutdown of heavily-polluting existing facilities.61 
New facilities would be allowed to locate in such areas if their 
emissions would be offset by a reduction in existing source emis-
sions resulting in a "positive net air quality benefit."62 
58. See I W. Rodgers, Environmental Law-Air and Water 273 (1986). 
59. Id. ("(T]he predicted consequence of non-attainment under the 1970 
amendments was a flat ban on new sources for the obvious reason, to put it 
starkly, that if prevailing air quality brought death and destruction, there was 
little to commend a move that would aggravate conditions already quite bad 
enough. The very real prospect, then, was a shutdown of industrial growth in 
many parts of the nation."). 
60. 41 Fed. Reg. 55,524, 55,528 (1976). 
61. Id. at 55,528. 
62. See id. at 55,528-29 (1976). 
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But this new EPA trade-off policy alone would not bring non-
attainment areas into compliance with the NAAQS. In 1977, 
Congress was forced to deal with this complex issue by adopting 
the first legislative component designed expressly to deal with the 
problem of non-attainment. 63 In a number of significant ways, 
this new component shifted the relationship between state and 
federal government in favor of stricter federal direction. 
IV 
THE 1977 CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS 
The 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments ("1977 Act") re-
sponded to the problem of non-attainment by adding a new Sub-
part D ("Part D") to the Act64 and by relying in part upon the 
fundamental planning and enforcement structure of the 1970 
Act65 as well as the EPA's trade-offpolicy.66 Specifically, the 1977 
amendments retained the pre-existing policy of nationally uni-
form attainment dates for all NAAQS pollutants.67 No considera-
tion was given to the idea of regionally variable attainment dates 
because the new law embraced a policy of complete regional and 
temporal uniformity in all matters pertaining to attainment. 
In the area of non-attainment, some innovations were incor-
porated into the 1977 law that limited state options for dealing 
with non-attainment conditions.68 The 1977 Act thus began to 
erode the traditional federal-state relationship. Nevertheless, 
while the EPA's powers were enhanced and more limitations on 
state discretion were imposed by the 1977 Act, the general pat-
tern of state planning and federal supervision continued. 
Designation of Non-Attainment Areas.-Following the 1977 Act, 
the attainment status of a geographical area had significant impli-
cations for the potential economic growth of a region. The 
63. Clean Air Act§§ 171-178, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7501-7508 (1988). See Con-
necticut Fund for the Env't, Inc. v. EPA, 672 F.2d 998, 1001 (2d Cir.), ccrt. 
denied sub nom. Manchester Envd. Coalition v. EPA, 450 U.S. 1035 (1982) 
("When it became apparent that many states would fail to meet the NAAQSs by 
even mid-1977 because of inadequate state regulation and industry violations, 
Congress rescued these states from a possible shutdown of existing sources of 
pollution and a ban on new sources in excessively polluted areas by amending 
the Act."). 
64. Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685, 746-51 (1977); see infra notes 78-80 
and accompanying text. 
65. See supra notes 45-57 and accompanying text. 
66. See supra notes 50-62 and accompanying text. 
67. Clean Air Act§ 172(a}, 42 U.S.C. § 7502(a) (1988) (amended 1990). 
68. Id. § 172(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b) (amended 1990). 
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amendments established a procedure for classifying all lands for 
purposes of the Act. First, it required that the states submit lists 
of data by early 1978 identifying the attainment status of all Air 
Quality Control Regions ("AQCRs") within their borders.69 Ar-
eas were to be classified as one of the following: attainment, non-
attainment, or unclassifiable.70 Next, Congress directed the EPA 
to promulgate this list either intact or as modified by the EPA. 71 
This step was to be accomplished within sixty days of the state's 
submittal of its list. The information upon which the attainment 
status designations were based was either direct monitoring data 
or diffusion computer model projections.72 Finally, non-attain-
ment status could change over time, requiring redesignation from 
one category to another. Redesignation requests generally come 
from the states; indeed, at least one federal court of appeals con-
cluded that the EPA could not modify existing designations un-
less a state had previously asked for the change. 73 
Extension of Attainment Deadlines and Non-Attainment Area SIPs.-
One way to avoid the problem of non-attainment was to redefine 
the concept of attainment by postponing the date by which the 
NAAQS had to be achieved. In 1977, Congress revised the at-
tainment principle when it adopted a two-tiered system of attain-
ment date extensions at five and ten year intervals. 74 The first 
deadline was applicable to all NAAQS pollutants, while the sec-
ond was available for those areas experiencing severe pollution 
created by automobiles. In selecting these deadlines, congres-
sional drafters optimistically believed that the times specified 
were reasonable and attainable throughout the nation. More-
over, the drafters failed to make any provision for states or re-
gions to obtain attainment date extensions beyond those set out 
in the 1977 Act. 75 
69. See id. § 107(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d)(1)(amended 1990). 
70. See id. 
71. Id. § 107(d)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d)(2) (amended 1990). 
72. Id. § 171(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7501(2) (1988). The statute clearly antici-
pated this information and courts were extremely willing to accept it. See Re-
public Steel Corp. v. Castle, 621 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1980); Cincinnati Gas & 
Elec. Co. v. Castle, 632 F.2d 14 (6th Cir. 1980); PPG Indus. Inc. v. Costle, 630 
F.2d 462 (6th Cir. 1980); and Columbus & Southern Ohio Elec. Co. v. Castle, 
638 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1980). 
73. See Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA, 723 F.2d 1303 (7th Cir. 1983); sec 
also 53 Fed. Reg. 29,724 (1988) (EPA's acquiescence to court ruling). 
74. See Clean Air Act§ 172(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7502(a) (1988). 
75. Id. Much of the structure ofPart D originated in the Senate's version of 
the bill. See 123 Cong. Rec. 27070 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S. Code Cong. 
& Admin. News 1570, 1573. 
COOPERATIVE FAILURE 27 
Nevertheless, the confident statements of the sponsors of the 
1970 Act about meeting the NAAQS in a timely fashion gave way 
to serious talk about the difficulty of reaching attainment status 
and the need for a carefully designed and well-implemented sys-
tem of regulation.76 As a matter of policy, these time extensions 
were not automatically effective; rather, they were conditioned 
upon the states undertaking and the EPA approving a number of 
SIP revisions to ensure that attainment would be reached by the 
dates set in the Act. These SIP revisions were mandatory obliga-
tions and necessary to avoid statutory sanctions.77 
Of greatest importance to this scheme was the requirement 
in section 172 that the states revise their SIPs to provide for at-
tainment "as expeditiously as practicable ... [but] not later than 
December 31, 1982."78 Enhanced SIP commitments were neces-
sary for further delay of the attainment date for carbon monoxide 
and hydrocarbons until 1987. Congress continued to rely upon 
the regulatory structure of air quality plans with concrete per-
formance objectives to be achieved by fixed future dates. 
Congress also set forth eleven explicit programmatic charac-
teristics for these revised SIPs.79 The program elements of an 
acceptable SIP did not require the gradual adjustment of the pre-
existing SIPs but rather mandated the adoption of significant new 
provisions to control state discretion in regulating air pollution 
sources in non-attainment areas. For instance, existing air pollu-
tion sources were forced to assist the attainment effort by comply-
ing with a new technology requirement termed "reasonably 
available control technology."80 Moreover, new sources were ob-
ligated to undergo a permitting process that included pre-con-
struction review and meeting a stringent series of approval 
conditions. 5 1 
As might be expected, even greater program demands were 
imposed for those states which requested the second stage exten-
76. 123 Cong. Rec. 27070 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S. Code Cong. & 
Admin. News 1570, 1573. 
77. See Clean Air Act § 172(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b) (1988) (amended 
1990). 
78. Id. § 172(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7502(a)(1) (amended 1990). 
79. See id. § 172(b}, 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b) (1988). This section contained a 
broad scope of the factors to be considered and emphasized existing source con-
trol, emission inventory data, new source permitting procedures, and organiza-
tion principles. 
80. Id. See also 40 C.F.R. § 5l.l(o) (1990) (regulatory definition ofRACT). 
81. See Clean Air Act§ 173(1)-(4), 42 U.S.C. § 7503(1)-(4) (1988) (amend-
ed 1990). 
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sion to 1987. In its specificity of SIP requirements, the 1977 Act 
at least began the process of federal control of state planning ac-
tivity in non-attainment areas and curbed state discretion in de-
signing a customized non-attainment plan. 
Upgraded Sanctions for SIP Failure .-Section 172 continued the 
previous practice of congressional specification of state air pollu-
tion program features followed by a process of EPA approval or 
disapproval within statutory deadlines. In this case, the states 
were required to have their revised SIPs approved by the EPA in 
less than two years from enactment of the 1977 amendments.82 
In addition, the 1977 Act maintained the EPA's existing power to 
prepare a SIP for any state failing to submit one deemed to be 
adequate.s3 
If this were the extent of the authority allotted the EPA to 
carry out the planning requirements of the non-attainment pro-
gram, the 1977 Act would not constitute a major departure from 
the 1970 Act. However, the drafters of the 1977 Act believed that 
the EPA needed greater leverage to ensure that states developed 
and implemented SIPs adequate to reach attainment status by 
1987. The potential impact of these new sanctions apparently 
was deemed sufficient to bring reluctant states into line. In real-
ity, however, the sanctions changed the EPA's relationship with 
the states, at least symbolically, to one in which the EPA was 
transformed into the superior force endowed with punitive 
powers. 
The 1977 amendments provided the EPA with a number of 
new enforcement mechanisms to assist it in obtaining state coop-
eration in the non-attainment program. The most prominent of 
these devices was the EPA's new authority, under section 
110(a)(2)(1), to prohibit construction or modification of major 
stationary sources in any non-attainment area that was not under 
a legitimate SIP.84 This new section indicated Congress' view 
that the EPA's pre-existing power to promulgate directly an SIP 
for a recalcitrant state was inadequate.85 Undoubtedly, the pre-
dominant policy imperative in the new section was the need to 
compel satisfactory state participation in the SIP development 
and implementation process. This construction ban authority ap-
peared to give the EPA tremendous leverage over uncooperative 
states by threatening the ability of such states to locate major in-
82. See id. § 172, 42 U.S.C. § 7502 (1988). 
83. Id. § 110(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c)(1) (amended 1990). 
84. I d. § 11 O(a)(2)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(1) (amended 1990). 
85. Id. § llO(c), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c) (amended 1990). 
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dustrial facilities in non-attainment areas.86 Congress apparently 
believed that, with regard to non-attainment, such an intrusion 
into local matters of land use and economic development was 
warranted. 
The Clean Air Act amendments also provided for three other 
sanctions which, if used, would deny federal funding for a variety 
of state and local government activities. 57 Thus, for the first time, 
Congress attempted to employ financial leverage in its air pollu-
tion law to obtain the cooperation, not of the regulated emission 
sources, but of the state governments themselves. The theory be-
hind these provisions was that fiscal pressure might accomplish 
what the construction ban and the threat of direct EPA SIP pro-
mulgation could not. 
Section 176 mandated that neither the EPA nor the Depart-
ment of Transportation would grant federal funds to states for 
use in a non-attainment area where transportation controls were 
needed to achieve attainment and the state had failed to submit a 
plan considering such controls.8B More generally, the Act also 
stated that no Clean Air Act grants would be made when an ap-
proved SIP was not being implemented.B9 Finally, the EPA was 
accorded discretionary authority to limit funds for the construc-
tion of sewage treatment works in any area where a state failed to 
effectuate a plan to control emissions associated with the sewage 
treatment facility.90 This third sanction gave the EPA potentially 
substantial power over local land development. 
Conclusions Regarding the 1977 Amendments and the Evolution of 
Non-Attainment Policy.-The 1977 Clean Air Act amendments rep-
resent the first direct legislative recognition of the non-attainment 
problem. The subpart D program reflected the recognition that 
the 1970 system of SIP development, approval, and enforcement 
had failed to reach its primary objective: the NAAQS remained 
important yet unrealized public health goals even after seven 
years. The national goal of achieving uniformly healthy air had 
proved to be more elusive than the drafters of the 1970 Act 
86. The General Accounting Office ("GAO") analyzed the impact of the 
construction ban and indicated that it was largely ineffective as of 1985. See 
GAO, EPA's Sanctions Policy Is Not Consistent with the Clean Air Act, GAO/ 
RCED-85-121 (1985) [hereinafter GAO Repon]. 
87. See Clean Air Act§ 176(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7506(a) (1988); id. § 176{b), 42 
u.s.c. § 7506(b); id. § 316(b), 42 u.s.c. § 7616(b). 
88. Id. § 176(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7506(a). 
89. ld. § 176(b), 42 u.s.c. § 7506(b). 
90. ld. § 316(b), 42 u.s.c. § 7616(b). 
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imagined. Reaching that goal would require time, programmatic 
sophistication, and a willingness to sacrifice short-term economic 
interests for long term health benefits. 
It was apparent that the true price for the uniform attainment 
of the NAAQS under the 1977 legislation would have to be paid 
at the state and local level. By focusing on stationary source and 
transportation control measures and setting forth enhanced plan-
ning and permitting regulatory requirements applicable only to 
sources in non-attainment areas, the Act established an undesir-
able classification surely unwanted by state and local govern-
ments.91 For classification of part of a state's territory as non-
attainment would limit its industrial growth and demand greater 
air quality planning effort. 
While operating within the general structure of the 1970 air 
quality planning program, the 1977 Clean Air Act amendments 
altered the principles of cooperative federalism stated by the 
prior Act: any idea that the air pollution law would harness the 
collaborative energies of equals was surely abandoned. The ele-
ments set out in subpart D specified state participation in terms of 
precise programmatic and permitting requirements. State gov-
ernment was to be viewed not as an equal partner in the pollution 
control effort but rather as an unwilling instrument of the federal 
air pollution policy. 
Within this revised statutory scheme, Congress gave little 
thought to the continuing relationship of the EPA and the states. 
While the ultimate objective of reaching attainment was clearly 
set out,92 little statutory attention was given to the direction of 
the EPA in its management of the subpart D program. The ab-
sence of guidance to the Agency combined with the lack of truly 
effective state inducements and sanctions created the potential for 
a program which would fail to achieve its purpose. Like its prede-
cessor,93 the 1977 Act also failed to consider the possibility that 
attainment would not be achieved by the extended attainment 
dates. Possibly, this failure reflected its confidence in the new 
regulatory program and optimism about the program's eventual 
91. The most direct reflection of this was the high number of cases filed to 
challenge the non-attainment designation process. See, e.g., Western Oil & Gas 
Ass'n v. EPA, 767 F.2d 603 (9th Cir. 1985); Dressman v. Costle, 759 F.2d 548 
(6th Cir. 1985); U.S. Steel Corp. v. EPA, 605 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1979). 
92. See Clean Air Act§ 172(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. 7502(a)(1) (1988) (amended 
1990). 
93. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text. 
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success. The experience since 1977 shows that this confidence 
was misplaced. 
v 
POST-1977 EXPERIENCE OF THE NON-
ATTAINMENT PROGRAM 
Enactment of the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendment's non-at-
tainment provisions did not result in the achievement of the 
NAAQS.94 More than thirteen years after the passage of that leg-
islation, the attainment goal remains elusive. The post-1977 ex-
perience with the non-attainment program reveals a pattern of 
delayed and reluctant cooperation between the EPA and the 
states in the preparation of the revised SIPs and the implementa-
tion of control measures intended to lead the nation towards the 
objective of clean air. This time period also has witnessed a 
change in the EPA's role: instead of encouraging and certifying 
the state preparation of adequate SIPs, it now disapproves of 
state SIP development and threatens substantial sanctions on un-
cooperative states. The EPA's policy in this area could also be 
inconsistent, and one that labors against the pressure of 
unachievable, uniform statutory deadlines. Beyond this, the EPA 
spent most of the 1980s attempting to design a post-attainment 
date non-attainment policy in the absence of direct congressional 
guidance. 
Attempts to Follow the Act.-In formulating the 1977 amend-
ments, Congress sought to ensure achievement of the new 
NAAQS attainment dates by imposing a precise schedule for air 
quality planning and implementation.95 A range of sanctions also 
were made available to bolster the EPA's authority to obtain nec-
essary SIP revisions and the adoption of control measures.96 
First, the non-attainment areas were to be identified and formally 
listed by early 1978.97 The EPA met this requirement by promul-
94. See Grider, Interstate Air Pollution: Over a Decade oflneffective Regu-
lation, 64 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 619 (1988) ("Unfortunately, [the 1977 amendments 
to the Clean Air Act] have not proven effective. Case law and statutory analysis 
demonstrate that there are no current regulations ••• at the federal or state level 
which provide an adequate remedy for states plagued by interstate air 
pollution."). 
95. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 
(1977). 
96. See id., 91 Stat. at 704; supra notes 45-63 and accompanying text. 
97. See id. § 103, 91 Stat. at 687-88 (adding Clean Air Act§ 107(d)(1), 42 
u.s.c. § 7407(d)(1) (1988)). 
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gating attainment status designations under section 107(d).98 In 
March 1978, the EPA designated over four hundred areas as non-
attainment for one or more primary or secondary NAAQS.99 
Once the geographical extent of non-attainment status was 
known, the second step of the program required the state submis-
sion of SIP revisions for non-attainment areas no later than 
January 1, 1979.100 These revisions were intended to contain rea-
sonably available control measures ("RACM") and were expected 
to demonstrate annual incremental progress towards the 
December 31, 1982 attainment date.I01 An examination of the 
statutory design reveals an SIP revision process and implementa-
tion of control strategies which were to occur within a com-
pressed period of time. This temporal element, along with the 
fundamental difficulty of the task, would cause the EPA to 
reformulate its approach numerous times without substantial 
success. 
The EPA initially took a forceful position with regard to the 
demands of Part D. In July 1979, it issued a rule stating that the 
construction ban authorized by section 11 O(a)(2)(1) would apply 
immediately to any designated non-attainment area that did not 
have an approved SIP. 102 Because the EPA had not approved any 
Part D SIPs for carbon monoxide and ozone at the time, the ban 
became effective in every non-attainment area. This sanction 
would be removed gradually over the next three years, however, 
as most states submitted their SIPs (originally required in January 
1979) and the EPA approved or "conditionally" approved 
them. 103 By the end of 1982, therefore, most ozone and carbon 
monoxide non-attainment areas were not under the construction 
ban for failing to have an approved SIP.to4 
By its terms, the 1977 Act required not only approved and 
timely air quality planning, but also actual attainment of the 
NAAQS by December 31, 1982.105 As 1982 drew to a close, the 
98. See id., 48 Fed. Reg. 4,972 (1982). 
99. See 43 Fed. Reg. 8,962 (1978). The EPA adjusted many of these desig-
nations in the fall of 1978. See id. at 40,502. 
100. Clean Air Act§ 172(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. 7502(a)(1) (1988). 
101. Id. 
102. 44 Fed. Reg. 38,471 (1979). 
103. See 48 Fed. Reg. 5,022 (1983). For a specific example of conditional 
approval of SIPs, see id. at 5,282 (conditional approval of Indiana SIP); see also 
1990 Act, supra note 3, § 101, 104 Stat. at 2407 (providing for conditional ap-
proval of SIP revisions). 
104. See 48 Fed. Reg. at 5,025-29. 
105. Clean Air Act§ 172(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. 7502(a)(1) (1988). 
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EPA embarked upon a strategy of employing existing air quality 
data to list the 4 74 non-attainment counties as either a Tier I or a 
Tier II county.106 Tier I consisted of approximately 330 counties 
that had their SIP revisions fully approved, would likely meet all 
attainment deadlines, and could have their area redesignated as 
attainment during 1983.107 Tier I would not be subject to future 
sanctions. Tier II was comprised of 111 counties that would not 
likely meet their deadline for one or more pollutants and thirty-
three other counties that still had not met all of their 1979 SIP 
revision requirements.1os 
Adapting the Part D Program to the Reality of Continuing Non-At-
tainment.-The EPA targeted the Tier II group for the sanctions 
provided by the Act. After the passage of the 1982 attainment 
date, it took an aggressive position regarding both the non-attain-
ment deadlines and the use of available sanctions as leverage 
against the states. Specifically, the EPA proposed to disapprove 
the SIPs of Tier II areas and impose the Act's construction 
ban.109 This position was decisive and best effectuated the literal 
meaning of the Clean Air Act. It rightly accorded little room for 
avoiding the statutory commands of the 1977 Act. The position 
also reflected a belief that the construction ban was an influential 
and potentially motivating force which would prompt the states to 
reach attainment.110 By taking this punitive approach, moreover, 
the EPA's role became decidedly more adversarial toward the 
states. Ultimately, this position became impossible to sustain. 
The EPA's policy of strict enforcement brought on a 
firestorm of criticism from Congress, the states, and the public in 
general.111 Much of the criticism emphasized that the widespread 
imposition of the construction ban would penalize those states 
which had made good faith efforts to control emissions but 
failed. 112 More importantly, it was feared that widespread use of 
the construction ban would cause serious harm to local econo-
mies.113 Congress was sufficiently attuned to this opposition to 
the EPA's interpretation of its statutory mandate. It enacted leg-
106. See 48 Fed. Reg. 4,972-73 (1983). 
107. See id. at 4,975 and Appendix C. 
108. See id. at 4,973 and Appendi.x D. 
109. Id. at 4,972. 
110. The 1985 GAO report cast doubt both on the legality of the EPA's 
post-1982 policy and the efficacy of the construction ban as a motivator. See 
GAO Report, supra note 86, at 15-16. 
IlL See id. at 3. 
112. See id. at 6. 
113. See id. 
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islation barring the Agency from using any appropriated funds 
during the 1984 fiscal year to impose the construction ban in non-
attainment areas with previously approved SIPs. 114 
In response to both the funding law and the vocal opposi-
tion, the EPA reversed its construction ban policy and allowed 
non-attainment states one more year to revise their SIPs in order 
to provide for attainment "as expeditiously as practicable."ll& 
Furthermore, this revised policy emphasized a new spirit of coop-
erative planning rather than the imposition of sanctions. 116 Nev-
ertheless, as a check against recalcitrance, the new EPA policy 
mandated that the construction ban and the funding sanctions 
could be imposed in the event that a state failed to respond to this 
SIP call in an adequate fashion.ll 7 
As the 1980s progressed, it became increasingly apparent 
that NAAQS violations for ozone and carbon monoxide would 
continue well beyond the Clean Air Act's ultimate 1987 deadline. 
Laboring under a statute which accorded it very little flexibility, 
the EPA realized that attainment could be reached in the short 
term-the early 1990's-only through the use of "draconian" 
measures that would be "severely disruptive." 118 Using adminis-
trative ingenuity, the Agency developed two proposals in 1986 to 
"reasonably" tighten state SIPs through greater EPA involvement 
so that attainment would be reached at some indeterminate fu-
ture point. 119 By mid-1987, however, the EPA concluded that it 
114. See Department of Housing and Urban Development-Independent 
Agencies Appropriation Act, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-45, 97 Stat. 219, 226 (1983). 
115. States also would have an opportunity to cure other deficiencies in the 
SIPs. See 48 Fed. Reg. 50,686 (1983). The EPA employed contorted reasoning 
to reach the conclusion that Part D did not require the SIPs to provide for actual 
attainment. See id. at 50,690-91. 
116. In February, 1984, the EPA made calls for 27 SIP revisions in 15 
states: 18 revisions for ozone, 6 for carbon monoxide, 2 for sulfur dioxide, and 
I for nitrogen dioxide. Of these 27 revisions, 21 were for areas with approved 
SIPs which had failed attainment by 1982 and 6 were for areas which had not 
even submitted an SIP. Later, in December 1984, the EPA made 10 more calls 
for SIP revisions in 9 more states. See GAO Report, supra note 86, at 15. 
117. 48 Fed. Reg. 50,693 (1983). During mid-1982, the EPA began receiv-
ing supplemental SIP revisions for 1987 extension areas. The EPA acknowl-
edged that the SIPs for some large urban areas would not be able to 
demonstrate attainment by 1987 under any configuration. Id. However, the 
EPA stated that it would consider approving such an SIP if the state showed that 
it would produce attainment shortly thereafter. See 46 Fed. Reg. 7,182 (1981). 
118. 52 Fed. Reg. 26,404 (1987). 
I 
119. See id. (discussing "Sustained Progress Program" and the "Reason· 
able Extra Efforts Program"). 
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did not have sufficient authority to embark on such a course with-
out a clearly stated statutory mandate. 120 
During the next two years, the EPA developed its present 
non-attainment policy, which resulted in the disapproval of the 
pending SIPs and in the issuance of new calls for SIP revisions. 
By November, 1989, the EPA issued SIP calls for ozone revisions 
in 184 counties containing over 135 million people, and carbon 
monoxide revisions in 121 counties with nearly ninety million 
people.121 
The Agency's approach in the late 1980s was influenced by 
the extended process of statutory amendment that had been un-
denvay for most of the decade.122 The uncertainty caused by the 
continuing possibility of a comprehensive legislative alteration to 
the non-attainment provisions certainly affected the way in which 
both the states and the EPA viewed their respective tasks. States 
had little incentive to embark upon major new air quality plan-
ning initiatives when the statutory demands were sure to change. 
Congressional delay in amending the Clear Air Act contrib-
uted both to this problem and to the current problem of nation-
wide non-attainment by denying the EPA necessary policy 
guidance and clear authority to act. To avoid this type of admin-
istrative uncertainty and to ensure that the EPA can deal effec-
tively with the states, Congress must concentrate on making the 
Act's non-attainment provisions not only effective as a matter of 
environmental objective, but also more durable and adaptable 
over time. The post-1977 experience has made the optimism ex-
pressed by the drafters of the Clean Air Act of 1970 at least pre-
mature. The enormous resources expended by government and 
industry to comply with the mandates of the Act failed to achieve 
the Act's fundamental attainment goal: uniformly healthy air 
throughout the nation. At present, over 150 million Americans 
live in areas with air that violates the federal primary air quality 
120. See id. (1987 public notice stating that the EPA should not "make 
choices between health and economic values that arc essentially legislath·c in 
character and magnitude. It is not properly the EPA's role as an administrative 
agency to take on the task of making such choices without a considcrnbl}' 
stronger indication of Congressional delegation than now exists."). 
121. See EPA, Status in 1988 & 1989 Calls for State Implementation Plan 
Revisions-Ozone and Carbon Monoxide (1989). 
122. The Senate Report on S. 1630-the precursor to the 1990 Clean Air 
Act amendments-described the extended, unsuccessful attempts to enact com-
prehensive clean air legislation in 1982, 1984, and 1987. SeeS. Rep. No. 228, 
lOlst Gong., 1st Sess. 4 (1989). 
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standards for health.12s 
Thus, after twenty years, the main objectives of the Clean Air 
Act have not yet been realized. In the 1990s, attainment of the 
health-related air quality standards remains an elusive yet socially 
desirable goal. But the development of the policy to achieve this 
goal must occur over time, for environmental policy in the United 
States is not static; its progression is influenced by numerous 
forces, both within and outside government. As in other environ-
mental areas, the dominant pattern of federal air pollution law is 
the incremental development of legislative policy as objectives 
change and experience is acquired. With the 1990 amendments, 
Congress has greatly refined non-attainment policy and given se-
rious attention to federal-state relations. 
VI 
THE FUTURE DIRECTION OF THE NON-
ATTAINMENT PRINCIPLE: THE 1990 
CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS 
Clean Air Act Development .-The third major revision of federal 
air pollution policy after the 1970 and 1977 Acts occurred in 
November 1990 and likely will set the direction of air pollution 
public policy for the next decade. The 1990 amendments to the 
Clean Air Act (" 1990 Act") 124 are truly comprehensive modifica-
tions to air pollution control law in this nation. A document for-
midable in length and complexity, the legislation addresses entire 
new areas of concern such as air toxics, 125 acid deposition con-
trol, 126 and stratospheric ozone127 and global climate protec-
tion.128 The amendments also have affected subjects already 
treated by pre-existing law by adding considerably to the detail 
and specificity of the statutory language.129 The non-attainment 
issue is one of these topics. 130 In supplementing the coverage of 
the Part D provisions of the 1977 Act, Congress has substantially 
123. See id. at II. 
124. 1990 Act, supra note 3. 
125. See, e.g., id. §§ 301-306, 104 Stat. at 2531-84 (mobile source-related 
air toxics). 
126. See id. §§ 401-413, 104 Stat. at 2584-634. 
127. See id. §§ 601-603, 104 Stat. at 2648-72. 
128. See, e.g., id. § 821, 104 Stat. at 2699. 
129. See, e.g., id. § 102, 104 Stat. at 2399-471 (provisions for attainment 
and maintenance of NAAQS). 
130. Id. §§ 101, 171-172, 104 Stat. at 2399, 2412-15. 
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redefined its non-attainment policy and attempted to cure defects 
identified during the last thirteen years. 
Retention of the Attainment Objective with Variable Achievement 
Deadlines .-Although numerous changes have been made to the 
format and coverage of the non-attainment provisions, the basic 
structure of the pre-existing policy ofboth the 1970 Act and 1977 
Act is left intact. Thus, the new law retains the essential organiz-
ing concept of attainment of the NAAQS as a nationally uniform 
definition of clean air.I3I 
However, this legislation has made even familiar concepts 
considerably more complex. For instance, in contrast to the 1977 
law, under which every state was required to have air quality con-
forming to the requirements of the NAAQS by a single, fixed 
deadline, the 1990 Act states that the uniform air pollution stan-
dard need not be achieved at the same time in all parts of the 
nation.132 Attainment dates vary in two ways. First, different 
lengths of time to reach attainment are provided for different 
NAAQS pollutants. Second, different lengths of time are allo-
cated to reach attainment for each pollutant depending upon the 
severity of the pollution in each non-attainment area.133 This va-
riation in attainment dates reflects a congressional recognition 
that the time allowed for air pollution cleanup should be tailored 
to the pollutant and to the severity of the pollution. Conse-
quently, attainment dates for the same pollutant would vary in 
length according to the level of NAAQS violation. Therefore, it 
would be possible for a state to have up to five different attain-
ment dates for ozone in different parts of its territory. 
Congress also decided to exercise greater control over both 
the general process of establishing non-attainment status and the 
specific identification of the degrees of non-attainment. Unlike 
the 1977 Act, the new statute defines certain areas as non-attain-
ment as a matter oflaw, thereby restricting the ability of both the 
EPA and the states to influence such important regulatory defini-
tions.134 Furthermore, the EPA's authority to redesignate an area 
from non-attainment to attainment is circumscribed by a specific 
six-part test intended to reflect the Agency's determination of 
131. Id. § 181(a)(1), 104 Stat. at 2423. 
132. See id. 
133. The 1990 Act establishes five categories of ozone non-attainment-
marginal, moderate, serious, severe, and extreme--and defines them in techni-
cal terms. See id. 
134. See id. § 101(a), 104 Stat. at 2399 (amending Clean Air Act§ 107(d), 
42 u.s.c. § 7407(d) (1988)). 
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complete compliance with the Act. 1ll5 This pattern of highly de-
tailed congressional directive is repeated throughout the 1990 
Act, and it substantially limits the discretion of both the EPA and 
the states. 1ll6 
Federal Financial Support of State Air Pollution Control Programs.-
One consistent feature of federal air pollution law has been the 
recognition of the federal government's role in providing funding 
for state air pollution programs. The new statute extends this 
practice by authorizing general funding for state programs and 
specific funding for non-attainment programming. 137 
In addition to the extension of this traditional form of inter-
governmental program support, the Act also requires that states 
tap new revenue sources to support their air quality programs. It 
directs states to charge pollution sources permit fees in an 
amount sufficient to cover the reasonable costs of developing and 
administering the Clean Air Act permit system. 138 These fees, a 
mandatory component of each state's SIP, are correlated to the 
amount of source emissions to encourage reduction of such emis-
135. Clean Air Act §§ 107(d)(3)(A)-(F), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7407(d)(3)(A)-(F) (as 
amended by 1990 Act, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § lOl(a), 104 Stat. 2399, 2401-02 
(1990)). 
136. See supra notes 56-57, 87-90 and accompanying text. 
137. See 1990 Act, supra note 3, § 822, 104 Stat. at 2699 (amending Clean 
Air Act. § 327, 42 U.S.C. § 7626 (1988)). With the expansion of planning and 
regulatory responsibilities under the 1990 amendments, the availability of in-
creased governmental financial resources became a significant issue, especially 
in light of what had occurred in the 1980s. While air program demands grew, 
the funding available fell in nominal and real terms. This drop was considered 
one of the primary reasons for the failure of the non-attainment program to 
reach its goals during the 1980s. SeeS. Rep. No. 228, 10lst Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1989). The Senate committee report addressed this issue of inadequate gov-
ernment funding and concluded that: 
Lack of resources at the Federal, State and local level has severely ham-
pered implementation of the Act's requirements. During the decade of the 
1980's, while the demands on EPA grew, appropriated funds for the air pol-
lution program, as for other EPA programs, decreased both in nominal and 
real terms. States, which are required by the Act to impose permit fees to 
cover the costs of administering and enforcing permit programs, in many 
instances have not complied. Lack of resources led to preparation of inade-
quate and incomplete inventories, use of less costly-and less accurate-
models, less frequent review and updating of inventories and other data on 
which control strategies are based, inadequate enforcement programs, and, 
at the Federal level, woefully inadequate oversight of, and technical assist-
ance to, the States. 
S. Rep. No. 228, 10lst Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1989). 
138. See 1990 Act, supra note 3, § 101, 104 Stat. at 2405 (amending Clean 
Air Act§ 110(a)(2)(L), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(L) (1988)). 
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sions. Thus, as emission reductions occur, the fees decline. In 
general, the fees are intended to provide states with funds with 
which to operate their air pollution programs. 139 The new financ-
ing method shifts the cost of such programs from the state to the 
polluters themselves and also makes state agencies somewhat less 
dependent upon state appropriation and federal program sup-
port. Potentially, these funds could help the states undertake 
their non-attainment planning and enforcement actions in a more 
professional and scientifically defensible way. 
Federal Technical Assistance .-As the primary federal environ-
mental agency, the EPA has the responsibility and specialized 
competence for the production of technical information that 
would be useful to the states in their air quality planning and reg-
ulation. This function of expert consultant to the states is ex-
tremely important because it can increase the technical 
sophistication and effectiveness of SIPs. The 1990 amendments 
charge the EPA ·with the duty of preparing a number of significant 
guidance documents. There are at least three examples of this 
requirement. 
First, within six months of enactment of the amendments, the 
EPA must issue two sets of guidelines for effective SIP develop-
ment and evaluation. The first set of guidelines is for enhanced 
air quality monitoring techniques, and the second, for improved 
air emission source inventories.140 General adoption of the tech-
niques listed in these documents could improve the accuracy of 
SIPs and create a greater uniformity of air quality regulatory prac-
tices from state to state. 
Second, within one year of enactment, the EPA must publish 
information regarding the formulation and emission-reduction 
potential of at least sixteen transportation control measures.l41 
Such information could assist a state in designing a series of con-
trol measures to combat automobile-created air pollution. More-
over, the information is not merely advisory, for it must be used 
in ozone non-attainment areas to offset growth in vehicle miles 
traveled. 
Third, the EPA is required to produce new control technique 
guidelines ("CTGs") for eleven categories of ozone stationary 
139. Id. Many states have not complied with the requirement that they 
charge fees. SeeS. Rep. No. 228, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1989). 
140. Clean Air Act§ l08(g) (as amended). 
141. 1990 Act, supra note 3, § 108(b), 104 Stat. at 2465-66 (amending 
Clean Air Act § 108(£)(1), 42 U.S.C. 7408(£)(1) (1988)). 
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sources by 1993 and review periodically all existing CTGs. 142 
The identification of available control technology is a function 
well-suited to the EPA. Furthermore, these centrally issued and 
nationally uniform CTGs can assist states in developing specific 
emission limitations for many previously undercontrolled or un-
controlled sources. 
Under the Act, the EPA also must issue CTGs or regulations 
for certain specialized industrial sites and functions, including the 
loading and unloading of petroleum carrying vessels, aerospace 
coating and solvent applications, consumer and commercial prod-
ucts, and hazardous waste facilities. 143 With the increased need 
for obtaining additional units of emission reductions, these spe-
cial provisions will take on added significance. For, while they 
grant states technical information, the provisions also deprive 
states of the ability to control these source categories in a less 
stringent manner. 
Emphasis on State Implementation Plans .-Another major ele-
ment of the pre-existing Clean Air Act strategy retained by the 
1990 amendments is use of the SIP as the central air quality plan-
ning and regulatory device to achieve NAAQS attainment objec-
tives. In their revised 1990 form, SIPs continue to serve as the 
focus of the Clean Air Act program. The 1990 Act also maintains 
primary state responsibility for the development and implementa-
tion of these plans. Furthermore, the EPA retains its role of 
evaluator and plan designer in case of state failure. 144 
The 1990 Act soon departs from these general similarities to 
prior practice. The Act attempts to address a number of serious 
deficiencies that Congress believes contributed to the current 
widespread state of non-attainment. 
SIP Development Rules .-The new statute sets forth several 
general changes intended to improve the SIP development and 
evaluation process. First, the Agency's power to partially approve 
or disapprove a SIP submission has been confirmed. 145 Second, 
the Act establishes new timetables and procedures for the evalua-
142. Id. § 103, 104 Stat. at 2443 (adding Clean Air Act § 183(a)-(b)). 
143. Id., 104 Stat. at 2443-44 (adding Clean Air Act § 183(b)-(c)). 
144. See Clean Air Act § llO(c)(l) (as amended) (concerning the prepara-
tion of a Federal Implementation Plan ("FIP")). However, the Senate Report on 
S. 1630 stated that the EPA intervention and takeover of the SIP would be con-
sidered a "last resort." SeeS. Rep. No. 228, lOlst Gong., 1st Sess. 22 (1989). 
145. 1990 Act, supra note 3, § lOl(c), 104 Stat. at 2406-07 (adding Clean 
Air Act § 11 0(k)(3), (4), 42 U.S.C. § 741 O(k)(3), (4)). This portion would over-
rule Abramowitz v. EPA, 832 F.2d 1071 (9th Cir. 1987). 
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tion of initial and revised SIPs, and directs the EPA to issue mini-
mum criteria to apply when revie·wing the newly-submitted 
SIPs.146 Moreover, the EPA's time allotted for reviewing submit-
ted plans was extended to twelve instead of four months, in order 
to allow the needed review and rulemaking proceeding.147 The 
minimum completeness rules, coupled with the longer time allot-
ted for closer scrutiny of SIPs should prove helpful to the states 
and should expedite the EPA's SIP review process by eliminating 
consideration of truly inadequate state plans. 
Of major importance is the 1990 Act's enumeration of spe-
cific SIP development practices and control techniques required 
to combat each kind of NAAQS violation.14S Since accurate 
emissions data is regarded as critical to the air quality regulatory 
process, the 1990 Act mandates that the states use EPA monitor-
ing and inventory guidance to prepare revised emission 
inventories.149 
Substantive Non-Attainment SIP Requirements.-The 1990 Act 
significandy modifies the previous non-attainment planning re-
quirements by specifying program elements for each pollutant.Hio 
In addition, non-attainment areas for each pollutant are classified 
in terms of the severity of the NAAQS violation, and the new Act 
defines required programmatic components for each such classifi-
cation. For example, SIPs in "moderate" carbon monoxide non-
attainment areas need only have "enhanced" vehicle inspection 
and maintenance programs, 151 while SIPs for "serious" areas re-
quire listed transportation control measures, oxygenated fuels 
programs, and employer ridership programs.152 Moreover, the 
statute sets out the mandatory steps to be taken to satisfy each 
component ·with such precision that there should be litde uncer-
tainty concerning statutory expectations.153 Furthermore, be-
cause many of these specified SIP elements require control 
146. 1990 Act, supra note 3, at§ 101(c), 104 Stat. at 2406-07 (adding Clean 
Air Act § llO(k), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(k)). 
147. Id. § 101(c), 104 Stat. at 2406 (adding Clean Air Act § 110(k)(2), 42 
u.s.c. § 7410(k)(2)). 
148. See id. §§ 103-106, 104 Stat. at 2423-64 (adding Clean Air Act 
§§ 181-190). 
149. See id. § 103, 104 Stat. at 2430 (adding Clean Air Act§ 182(c)(1), 42 
U.S.C. § 7511a(c)(1)). 
150. Id. §§ 103-106, 104 Stat. at 2423-64 (adding Clean Air Act §§ 181-
190). 
151. Id. § 104, 104 Stat. at 2455 (adding Clean Air Act § 187(a)(6)). 
152. Id. § 104, 104 Stat. at 2456 (adding Clean Air Act § 187(b)(2)-(3)). 
153. See, e.g., id. § 103, 104 Stat. at 2440-42 (adding Clean Air Act 
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measures that are potentially unpalatable to state or local govern-
ments, the fact that they are imposed by direct congressional 
mandate could relieve the EPA of the duty of justifying such an 
unattractive SIP choice. 
The new law also creates detailed and objective SIP perform-
ance goals beyond the general admonition that they demonstrate 
attainment with the NAAQS by the relevant attainment date. For 
example, in ozone non-attainment areas classified as "serious," 
an approvable SIP must demonstrate "reasonable further pro-
gress," defined as an annual three percent reduction in the emis-
sion of volatile organic compounds ("VOC") over a specific three 
year period. 154 These goals do not specify the exact steps that a 
state must take; rather, they establish fixed, statutory standards 
against which the SIPs control techniques can be measured. In 
addition, the SIPs prepared for carbon monoxide and mandated 
that non-attainment areas contain quantitative "milestones," set 
at every three years, demonstrating "reasonable further pro-
gress" toward timely achievement of the NAAQS.l55 These mile-
stones were intended to serve as concrete and objective measures 
of the state's progress in reaching attainment. 156 With such clear 
SIP performance standards, it would be difficult for either the 
EPA or the states to claim that "reasonable" progress towards at-
tainment had been made when it had not. 
Continuing EPA/State SIP Management.-In response to an im-
portant criticism of prior practice, the 1990 Act directs continu-
ous state/federal program interaction throughout the life of the 
SIP. 157 Congress intended to compel EPA supervision over state 
SIP development and implementation on a continuing basis in or-
der to determine, in a rapid fashion, whether the state was mov-
ing toward expeditious attainment. The milestones and other 
express performance standards serve as helpful indicators of state 
progress. However, Congress appears to have been wary of the 
passage of time in the administrative context; it thus forced the 
EPA to take a considerably more active role in the management of 
§ 182(g)) (defining programmatic components in terms of specific performance 
criteria). 
154. Id. § 103, 104 Stat. at 2432 (adding Clean Air Act § l82(c)(2)(B)). 
155. I d. § 1 02(a)(2)(B), 104 Stat. at 2412 (amending Clean Air Act 
§ 171(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7501(1) (1988)). "Reasonable further progress" is de-
fined by the 1990 Act's language as "annual incremental reductions ... as are 
required ... for the purpose of ensuring" timely attainment. Id. 
156. Id. § 104, 104 Stat. at 2457 (adding Clean Air Act § 187(d) (CO 
milestone)). 
157. See id §§ 101, 102, 104 Stat. at 2399-423. 
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the Clean Air Act program. Consequently, several techniques 
were inserted in the Act to ensure closer EPA oversight of state 
conduct and air pollution control programs. In this ·way the 1990 
Act provides specific management directives governing EPA-state 
relations. 
As part of this strategy of increased federal oversight, the 
amendments impose regular reporting requirements on the states 
to submit data for the EPA's review. For example, SIPs for ozone 
areas must provide for annual reports discussing the air pollution 
control measures adopted or implemented during the year and an 
explanation of why the state failed to meet other SIP obliga-
tions.158 Periodic state emission inventories are also 
mandatory.159 Furthermore, at three year intervals, states must 
test the automotive travel assumptions upon which their SIPs are 
based and revise them if the earlier predictions underestimated 
actual car use in the area.160 This step provides an important 
check on over-optimistic state assumptions in SIP drafting. 
Default Provisions for Attainment Failure.-SIP failure to meet 
the NAAQS by the statutory deadline constituted one of the most 
serious deficiencies of the prior clean air laws.161 The 1977 law 
provided for no default mechanism and it was not clear what 
would happen if attainment was not reached on time. 162 The 
1990 Act responds to the deadline problem by establishing clear 
procedural and substantive obligations that would accrue in the 
event of SIP failure. These features seek to avoid the uncertainty 
and policy confusion which characterized the 1980s.163 
First, the 1990 Act requires states to anticipate the possibility 
of failure in the development of its SIP. Thus, every SIP must 
contain non-attainment contingency measures which are automat-
ically effective upon SIP failure and which reduce emissions by a 
statutorily prescribed amount.164 
Second, the new legislation spells out the longer-term impli-
158. Id. § 102(d), 104 Stat. at 2417. (amending Clean Air Act§ 174, 42 
u.s.c. 7504 (1988)). 
159. See id. § 103, 104 Stat. at 2426, 2427 (adding Clean Air Act 
§§ 182(a)(1), 182(a)(3)). 
160. Id., 104 Stat. at 2434-35 (adding Clean Air Act § 182(c)(4)). 
161. See supra notes 58-59, 115-19 and accompanying text. 
162. See supra notes 115-19 and accompanying text. 
163. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
164. See 1990 Act, supra note 3, § 102, 104 Stat. at 2414-15 (amending 
Clean Air Act § 172(c), 42 U.S.C. § 7502(c) (1988) (nonattainment plan provi-
sions in general)); id. § 104, 104 Stat. at 2454-55 (adding Clean Air Act 
§ 187(a)(3) (for carbon monoxide)). 
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cations of the failure to attain the NAAQS. Once again, the law 
emphasizes automatic effect, leaving little room for negotiation 
and delay. Upon failure to reach attainment in a timely fashion, 
the area involved must be reclassified into the next most serious 
non-attainment category-for instance, from serious to severe for 
an ozone non-attainment area. 165 The effect of the reclassifica-
tion would be to require within one year a SIP revision that im-
poses the attainment date and the enhanced control techniques 
applicable to the new classification}66 
In addition to this general SIP tightening, the Act demands 
further annual, incremental emission reductions of five percent 
until attainment is reached. 167 The Act also imposes automatic 
penalties on individual polluters in the event attainment is not 
reached. For example, in heavily-polluted ozone non-attainment 
areas failing to attain, a financial penalty is placed upon VOC 
sources even if they are in compliance with their SIP emission lim-
itations. Each major stationary source ofVOC would be required 
to pay an annual emissions fee of $5,000 per ton for certain 
emissions. 168 
Overall, these provisions reinforce the SIP program with a 
self-correcting mechanism defined in explicit terms and kept 
within the control of the statute. The drafters of these elements 
attempted to maintain consistent pressure on the states to reduce 
air pollution and to reach the attainment goal. Consequently, a 
great deal of the EPA's discretion was sacrificed-the inevitable 
result of the failure of prior collaborative schemes. 
Direct Federal Authority to Compel Attainment.-In order to reach 
attainment status by the statutory deadlines, the states and pollu-
tion sources must have the motivation to take the steps necessary 
to reach the Clean Air Act's goal of healthy air. One of the most 
significant problems in designing a national air pollution control 
strategy is determining a collaborative structure that will involve 
state and local governments in reaching federal objectives. The 
strategy of the 1990 Act is to focus on shared environmental val-
ues and joint effort. Moreover, the Act seeks to enforce coopera-
165. See id. § 103, 104 Stat. at 2424-25 (adding Clean Air Act§ 18l(b)(2)). 
166. See, e.g., id. § 104, 104 Stat. at 2458 (adding Clean Air Act § 187(g) 
(failure of serious area to attain standard for carbon monoxide)); id. § 105, 104 
Stat. at 2462 (adding Clean Air Act § 189(d) (failure to attain PM-10 standard)). 
167. Id. § 105, 104 Stat. at 2462 (adding Clean Air Act § 189(d)). 
168. Id. § 103, 104 Stat. at 2450-51 (adding Clean Air Act § 185(a)-(b)). 
The fee applies to all VOC emissions in excess of 80% of those allowed under 
the SIP. Id. (adding Clean Air Act § 185(b)(l)). 
COOPERATIVE FAILURE 45 
tion with the threat of federal regulatory takeover and the 
imposition of sanctions. 
The original justification for devising such an integrated sys-
tem of air pollution control was, in part, political and functional, 
for a completely federal system might not have been politically 
attractive to legislators who foresaw the likely effect the Clean Air 
Act would have on state regulation. Moreover, a joint federal/ 
state scheme of SIP preparation and implementation would give 
the impression that state and local governments exert significant 
control over a process designed to meet federal objectives with 
limited federal bureaucratic intervention. Indeed, as a practical 
matter the scheme allows state air program officials to serve as 
proxies for the EPA and thereby expands its workforce. 
To what extent may the EPA compel state and local govern-
ment participation in the Clean Air Act program?169 One answer 
is to empower the EPA to assume the state's programmatic re-
sponsibilities. Thus, the 1990 Act retained the 1970 Clean Air 
Act's provision for EPA intervention by allowing the EPA to de-
velop a Federal Implementation Plan. 170 But because complete 
federal takeover of the air quality planning process constitutes an 
extreme form of state displacement in a supposedly cooperative 
system of regulation, some alternative, intermediate authority-
short of total EPA domination-was needed to obtain the neces-
sary state participation. 
The 1990 Act's solution was to enforce its non-attainment 
program through a series of sanctions designed to punish recalci-
trant states for their lack of cooperation or failure. Specifically, 
the new Act gives the EPA authority to impose a series of varied 
sanctions whenever a state fails to perform in one of three ways: 
(1) it fails to submit a SIP, or its submitted SIP fails to meet the 
EPA's minimum criteria; (2) the EPA disapproves the state's SIP 
submission in whole or in part or (3) the EPA "finds that any re-
quirement of an approved SIP ... is not being implemented."171 
These three grounds focus both on the initial state responsibility 
of submitting a complying SIP and the subsequent question of 
inadequate implementation. If the EPA believes that any one of 
these grounds exists and that the state is not making reasonable 
169. The question assumes that satisfactory, voluntary cooperation from 
these governments is not forthcoming. 
170. See 1990 Act, supra note 3, § 102, 104 Stat. at 2422-23 (amending 
Clean Air Act § 110(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c)(1) (1988)). 
171. Id. § 102, 104 Stat. at 2420-21 (adding Clean Air Act § 179(a), 42 
U.S.C. 7509(a)). 
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efforts to cure the failure, it is under a statutory duty to apply at 
least one sanction from a list of two provided by the Act: (1) a 
limitation of the use of federal highway funds to specified projects 
that will improve traffic safety or air quality; or (2) an expanded 2 
to I emission offset requirement for new or modified sources 
wishing to locate in the non-attainment area. 172 
Each of these sanctions has a different potential impact. The 
limitation on Department of Transportation grants would redi-
rect federal funding from projects that adversely affect air quality 
to those that reduce dependence upon automobile transportation 
and encourage highway safety .17 3 The expanded offset require-
ment would make new and modified source location more diffi-
cult to accomplish. In short, both sanctions serve to impress the 
states with the significance of complying with the federal air qual-
ity control program. Moreover, having clearly enunciated and 
statutorily mandated sanctions lessens the EPA's discretion in 
their application. Mter all, Congress, not the EPA, imposes these 
collaborative obligations on the states. 
CONCLUSION 
The Clean Air Act is designed to achieve a number of impor-
tant environmental objectives. One of the most significant goals 
is national attainment of clean and healthful air. By creating a 
pre-set deadline to meet this objective, the drafters of the Clean 
Air Act also have created a possibility of failure. Although Con-
gress may select such a difficult social objective affecting so many 
interests, it cannot force the nation to reach it in a timely fashion 
by mere pronouncement. Rather, the public policy must be im-
plemented through a complicated series of decisions and actions. 
When Congress initially enacted the Clean Air Act in 1970, 
its intent was to achieve the NAAQS in a statutorily defined, expe-
ditious manner. In retrospect, however, it appears that the attain-
ment policy was adopted on the basis of faulty or at least overly-
optimistic assumptions about the dimension of American air pol-
lution, which have ultimately delayed attainment. However, these 
unrealistic assumptions concerning the nature of the nation's air 
172. See id., 104 Stat. at 2421-22 (adding §§ 179(b)(l)-(2), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7509(b)(l)-(2)). 
173. In discussing congressional intent behind the sanctions policy of the 
Senate bill S. 1630, the Senate Report only mentions the transportation grant 
sanction. Instead of emphasizing the loss of federal funding, it stresses the redi-
rection of such funds to beneficial purposes. See S. Rep. No. 228, lO 1st Con g., 
1st Sess. 26-28 (1989). 
COOPERATIVE FAILURE 47 
pollution problem have obscured a more serious legislative fail-
ure. While the 1970 Act created the main structural elements of 
the new federal air pollution control policy, it paid little attention 
to implementation theory, or addressed it with overly optimistic 
assumptions. 
The drafters of the 1970 Act failed to understand and to con-
front adequately the conflict of interests between the federal and 
state governments. They wrongly assumed that both levels of 
government would share the same values and that effective coop-
erative action would be the norm. The EPA primarily was inter-
ested in air quality enhancement, and was charged with the major 
responsibility of achieving public health and safety objectives, 
while the states and localities were increasingly concerned with 
the impact of environmental controls on their economic develop-
ment, living patterns, and personal mobility. The conflict of 
these potentially incompatible interests undercut the cooperative 
ideal and ultimately created the wrong incentives for the states. 
Indeed, the conflict may have tempted many states to underesti-
mate the severity of their air quality problems and to overestimate 
the impact of their solutions. 
With the passage of the 1977 amendments, federal air pollu-
tion law entered into a second phase in which Congress recog-
nized the need for greater non-attainment policy guidance and 
enhanced the EPA's ability to ensure state compliance with the 
non-attainment program. At the same time, however, congres-
sional involvement in designing the planning and enforcement as-
pects of the non-attainment program increased markedly. 
Congress replaced the original scheme of federal-state coopera-
tion in air quality achievement with federal supervision of state 
programs reinforced with fiscal and development sanctions. It 
also used the EPA as its occasionally reluctant agent to coerce the 
states. Nevertheless, the 1977 Act failed seriously to consider the 
difficulty of designing a cooperative and effective system of air 
quality attainment. 
The 1990 Clean Air Act amendments represent a third stage 
in intergovernmental relations. Congress retained the fundamen-
tal objective of NAAQS attainment and the basic strategy of rely-
ing upon SIPs, but introduced a model of congressional 
programmatic micro-management and an unprecedented in-
crease in detail. 174 By enacting a pollution control statute with 
such specificity, and out of frustration with the nation's failure to 
174. See supra notes 124-72 and accompanying text. 
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achieve the NAAQS in a timely fashion, Congress has significantly 
reduced the EPA's autonomy and state discretion. It avoided del-
egating authority to the EPA and instead established a largely 
self-executing system in which the solutions to air quality control 
problems are defined by Congress. In this way, the Clean Air Act 
has transformed the idea of delegating discretionary agency au-
thority into a system in which the EPA acts as a true legislative 
"agent." 
The final question to consider is whether the 1990 Clean Air 
Act amendments and the resulting modification in federal/state 
relationships are more likely to achieve air quality objectives than 
prior legislation. The ultimate answer is undoubtedly speculative 
and will depend upon a number of uncertain factors. 
One factor involves whether the 1990 Act's implementation 
process increases the likelihood that states, industries, and the 
general public will take the necessary steps to reduce air emis-
sions. For, despite the specificity and clarity of the implementa-
tion process and the possibility of EPA intervention, actual 
attainment of the NAAQS will ultimately depend upon such im-
portant factors as political will and popular support. Put bluntly: 
will the national environmental value of clean air be embraced by 
all affected parties? A second factor concerns the extent to which 
the state air pollution control agencies possess sufficient manage-
rial and political skill-and commitment-to carry out the SIPs. 
This factor is especially significant because many SIP provisions 
have local impacts and may be initially unpopular. Consequently, 
obtaining the firm and unwavering commitment of state and local 
government to the Act's clean air goals will be indispensable. 
"Foot dragging" on the part of state agencies will undoubtedly 
convert any EPA cooperation into an adversarial position. State 
recalcitrance could also trigger citizen suits, with the result being 
judicial management of the attainment program. A third factor is 
the durability of state and industry support for the Clean Air Act's 
program during the implementation period. A corollary to this 
factor is the extent to which the courts should be neutral or sup-
portive when aspects of the clean air program are challenged. A 
final consideration concerns the stability of the Clean Air Act's 
emphasis on uniform NAAQS attainment, and whether such a 
policy will be undermined in the future by competing public poli-
cies or changes in underlying economic or social conditions. The 
1990 Act recognizes that achieving air quality goals will take many 
years and require stable popular and legislative support at both 
state and federal levels of government. 
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Time will tell whether the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air 
Act achieve the results Congress intended. While federal-state in-
teraction has been retained, however, Congress modified the 
original idea of cooperative federalism with respect to air pollu-
tion control into a new cooperative federalism ·with precise rules. 
Possibly to design clear performance objectives, the new system 
has defined a process of non-attainment planning and enforce-
ment containing sequential steps with pre-determined stages. 
While this process might be criticized for eliminating flexibility, it 
at least expressed clearer congressional expectations. In an 
ironic way, this should remove pressure from both the EPA and 
the states, for the locally unattractive performance goals have 
been set from above by Congress. Moreover, this programmatic 
development mandated by the Act may actually create more of a 
technical role for the EPA--one of evaluating compliance with 
statutorily created standards. 
The history of the Clean Air Act reveals both the difficulty in 
reaching the Act's attainment goal and the delicacy of the federal-
state relationship. Although the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments 
have given greater attention to implementation questions, we can 
hope that Congress has found the correct balance to ensure that 
air will be clean throughout the nation. If this elusive goal is 
achieved, we will have gained much in our ability to develop co-
operative, intergovernmental systems to attain complex social 
objectives. In the end, this achievement may be as great as the 
environmental clean air goals themselves. 
